The Theory and Practice of Corporate Citizenship in Nigeria: A Petroleum Industry Beneficiary Analysis by Wilson Akpan
Akpan symposium paper, Ghana, 20-22 November 1
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP IN NIGERIA: A 
PETROLEUM INDUSTRY BENEFICIARY ANALYSIS1 
 
 
 
Dr. Wilson Akpan 
Lecturer, Department of Sociology 
University of Fort Hare 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
With the aid of ethnographic data obtained in Nigeria’s oil and gas region (the Niger Delta), and 
relevant secondary data, this article makes a case for a beneficiary-centered approach to corporate 
citizenship analysis, and thus urges a shift from the dominant corporatist approach. Two interrelated 
questions are examined: how do ordinary people who share their socio-ecologic and cultural 
neighbourhoods with petroleum operators encounter corporate citizenship, and what do such 
encounters say about corporate citizenship philosophy and practice in the Nigerian petroleum 
industry? The article is not an anti-theory of corporate citizenship or of the broader sustainable 
development debate.  Rather, it is a counter-narrative derived from the experiences and stories of 
ordinary people in beneficiary communities.  It offers some empirical bases for re-examining the 
conventional assumptions about both corporate citizenship and sustainable development.  
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Introduction 
 
One important contribution that Africa could make to the corporate citizenship discourse is to 
shift analytical focus from corporate “sustainability”, “social accountability”, and “community 
development” reports, to “corporate citizenship” as encountered by ordinary people who 
share their socio-ecologic and cultural spaces with large industrial corporations. Nigeria 
offers a particularly useful opportunity for this given the scale of its upstream oil and gas 
operations and the socio-political and environmental crisis that the petroleum industry has 
spawned in the country’s oil heartland, the Niger Delta. However, this push is not taking 
place nearly as vigorously as would be expected. As Amaeshi et al (2006) have noted, this is 
partly because a systematic, scholarly interest in corporate citizenship studies is still very 
“meagre” in Nigeria – and perhaps also in many other parts of the developing world.  
 
At a global level, the literature on corporate citizenship (or on its aliases - “corporate social 
responsibility”, “responsible competitiveness”, and “responsible commerce” - to name only a 
few) emphasizes the imperative of doing business with a social and ecologic conscience.  
However, the corporatist focus on what business enterprises and big organisations claim to 
be doing for their host communities and the broader society raises a concern as to whether 
the dominant approach to corporate citizenship studies can lead to a holistic understanding 
of what companies actually do in – and to - the community.  In other words, can we know all 
that we should about the character of corporate citizenship without shifting the gaze from the 
“corporate side” of corporate-community involvement? 
 
It may even be argued that contestations around the definitions of corporate citizenship, the 
“models” (Martin, 2004) for the “institutionalization” (Appels et al, 2006) of corporate 
citizenship, and, ultimately, what role corporations can or should play in sustainable 
development persist because the feelings and narratives of beneficiary communities about 
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corporate-community involvement have not yet been sufficiently privileged. Protests by 
activist organizations such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, Movement for the Survival 
of Ogoni People (MOSOP), and the like, as well as by ordinary people in the vicinity of 
industrial operations over the actions and inactions of corporations must be rigorously 
interrogated, for therein may lie critical analytical ingredients with which to make a realistic 
contribution to the theory and practice of corporate citizenship. In other words, there is an 
urgent need to understand the “beneficiary side” of corporate-community involvement. 
  
The central thesis of this article may be stated as a simple question: how do ordinary people 
who share their socio-ecologic and cultural neighbourhoods with big business encounter 
corporate citizenship? Put differently, what would the state of knowledge about, and 
advocacy around, corporate citizenship be if the narratives and first-hand experiences of 
“beneficiary” communities were taken as seriously as corporate “sustainability” and 
“community development” reports? The author approaches these questions not by proffering 
a simple answer (and such an answer would invariably take a great many empirical studies 
to evolve), but by examining the theory and practice of corporate citizenship in the Nigerian 
petroleum industry, which in recent years has witnessed a frenzied spate of deep offshore 
exploration activities. The main focus is on how corporate citizenship practices in the 
petroleum industry resonate with ordinary people in the immediate neighbourhoods of 
upstream petroleum business.   
 
In trying to understand the driving forces behind the heightened interest by the major 
transnational oil operators in deep offshore ventures, the article makes two assumptions. 
One – and the more obvious – is that such ventures are part of a broader resource scramble 
driven by the growing international demand for oil and the perceived economic promises of 
new deep offshore oil reserves. The ventures (which take place away from the village 
communities and the shallow waters, the erstwhile theatres of petroleum extraction in 
Nigeria) do no doubt promise to reinforce Nigeria’s position as Africa’s leading oil-producing 
country.  
 
The second assumption, which must be understood against the background that Nigeria still 
has lucrative oil reserves onshore and in the continental shelf (Businessday, 2005), is that 
the operators arguably perceive the economic and political risks associated with continued 
onshore expansion. This risks hinge in part on decades-long corporate citizenship failures in 
the Niger Delta.  It is evident in the fact that in recent years, disenchanted youths in the oil 
province youths have threatened to slash the oil companies’ fingers off “their” land – and in 
certain instances have made good their threats (Akpan, 2006a). The Niger Delta as a whole 
is awash with community protests and reports of disruptions to oil production activities, the 
kidnap of (mainly foreign) oil workers by irate youths, bloody clashes between youth groups 
and law enforcement agents, destruction of oil infrastructure and a generally restive 
atmosphere that many find inconducive to business operations. The rest of this article 
unfolds along the thrust of this second assumption. 
 
It must be stated at the outset that “corporate citizenship”, as used in this article, refers to 
what corporate organizations do (whether voluntarily or through legal compulsion) for the 
direct benefit of the broader community and the environment within which they operate – 
such activities being over and above what is directly and traditionally necessary to boost 
productivity and profit. This definition shifts attention away from the theory-of-everything 
character that corporate citizenship seems to have been imbued with in the literature. For 
this author, corporate citizenship does not include salaries and emoluments, union 
recognition, workplace health and safety, and other processes revolving around combining 
capital with labour to produce profit, much of which ordinarily falls within the rubric of labour 
relations. This definition questions the wisdom of some analysts who praise as “serious 
engagement with CSR initiatives” a named transnational company’s implementation of “living 
wage standards for all of its farm workers in every country in which it harvests fruit” (Aguilera 
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et al), and suggestions that such “CSR initiatives” will ultimately make a positive impact on 
the community and the ecosystem!2  
 
The article draws heavily on ethnographic data the author collected in three Niger Delta 
communities between March and November 2003.  There were the Bayelsa State town of 
Oloibiri (where commercial oil deposits were first struck in 1956), Ebubu, an Ogoni 
community (and another of the oldest oil communities, located in Rivers State), and Iko (in 
Akwa Ibom State)3. Although the article is not an in-depth analysis of community perceptions 
of the corporate citizenship activities of any single transnational oil company in Nigeria, nor 
should it be read as an overall assessment of corporate citizenship in the Nigerian petroleum 
industry as a whole, it was important for the author that the field work be done in some of the 
more prominent and historic oil-producing communities. Among such were host communities 
of Shell Petroleum, the biggest and oldest transnational oil operator in Nigeria. Historically 
Shell is also the operator with the most significant onshore presence in the country.  
 
Incidentally, in the new scramble for deep offshore oil reserves Shell has also played a 
pivotal role. For instance, the company’s announcement in 2005 of its having commenced 
crude oil production at the 60 square-kilometre Bonga oil field, located some 120 kilometres 
off Nigeria’s coast, drew considerable attention to Nigeria’s deep offshore oil potential (LNG 
Intelligence, 2005). The Bonga field has an estimated reserve of about one billion barrels of 
oil. Other companies that have announced deep offshore oil finds include: Agip (Abo field), 
Texaco/Famfa (Agbami field), ExxonMobil (Erha field), Chevron (Aparo field) (Nigeria Oil & 
Gas Online 2005) 
 
 
Corporate Citizenship: The Case for a Beneficiary Perspective 
 
As a systematic subject field, corporate citizenship is comparatively new in Nigeria.  One 
explanation for this, according to Amaeshi et al (2006), is the conventional association of the 
concept with big business. As these analysts point out, in Nigeria the term “big business” 
generally means transnational business, much of it concentrated in the oil and gas, 
telecommunication and manufacturing sectors.  Although a number of indigenous firms in the 
financial services sector (banks especially) have recently made, and are continuing to make, 
forays into other West African countries, the country’s business landscape is characterized 
by small and medium-scale (mainly family-owned) enterprises. Amaeshi et al (2006:18) 
further suggest that transnational corporations have more to lose in terms of reputation and 
investment if they remain impervious to “pressures” from civil society, market forces, 
globalization and consumers to operate in a socially responsible manner. By comparison, 
they argue, corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices among indigenous Nigerian 
businesses are driven by a deeply cultivated “propensity toward communitarian identity”.  In 
other words, the dominant business ethic among indigenous companies is about doing good 
for the broader community rather simply focusing the narrow financial objectives of business 
owners.   
 
Notwithstanding the distasteful essentialism in the above analysis, one notes the main 
contestations in the corporate citizenship debate in Nigeria, which the authors have drawn 
attention to. They revolve around the meanings companies, even the big indigenous Nigerian 
companies, attach to CSR.  In their recent survey of some of Nigeria’s major banks, Amaeshi 
et al (2006:29) found that although the banks had different CSR initiatives, and even 
considered such initiatives a “necessary” complement to government’s development 
programmes, the dominant “wave” of CSR was philanthropy and altruism. The authors 
                                                 
2 The reader may note that in Nigeria the upstream oil industry pays by far the highest wages at every level, creating what some 
have inappropriately termed a “labour aristocracy” in the country (HRW, 1999:95). Yet, the diverse social and environmental 
atrocities in the sector have led some analysts to warn Western consumers of Nigerian oil that they are actually consuming 
“blood that is mixed with… oil” (Olukoya 2001) 
3 For a detailed ethnographic profile of the three communities, the Niger Delta, and the structure of the Nigerian upstream 
petroleum industry see Akpan (2006a, 2005). 
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wondered why CSR in Nigeria had not “advanced” from, might one say, mere acts of 
kindness, to economic, legal and ethical responsibilities.  
 
Going by what Locke (2002:2-4) has identified as four-model discourse on corporate 
citizenship – namely “minimalist”, “philanthropic”, “encompassing” and “social activist” - 
Nigeria’s act-of-kindness model of CSR would not rank very highly: 
  
Most multinational firms operating in Nigeria… focus on either CSR mandates from their 
home countries or CSR activities that directly impact on their businesses… while sometimes 
ignoring local constructions of CSR (Amaeshi et al 2006: 27). 
 
What does “philanthropic” CSR entail? According to Ashley and Haysom (2006:268), it is 
typically “project specific”, relates to “specific issues relevant to a given organization”, and 
hardly goes beyond “donations and gifts”. This contrasts profoundly with “social activist” 
CSR, which seeks to bring about broad social change by “extending the boundaries of 
supposed beneficiaries beyond… a restricted number of shareholders and/or stakeholders” 
(Locke 2002:2-3). 
 
Some transnational oil companies in Nigeria have indicated awareness of these “waves”, and 
some, like Shell, have spoken of the limitations of the dominant corporate citizenship theory 
and practice in the country. As this author has reported elsewhere (Akpan 2006a:224), Shell 
in 1997 made public its decision to abandon “community assistance” CSR praxis, in favour of 
what it called a “proactive” approach, which entailed “world class” “community development” 
standards. In one of its Reports, the company called it a “strategic shift”, which ostensibly 
echoes Locke’s “social activist” CSR: 
 
The shift was informed by the need for communities to be in charge of their own 
development, and to foster greater partnership with development agencies and NGOs in 
capacity building within communities.  The aim was to promote the application of best 
practice in community development to boost family incomes and improve community welfare 
in Nigeria (SPDC 2002:15). 
 
In an interview with an officer in the Community Affairs department of Shell in Port Harcourt, 
the Niger Delta’s principal city and one of Shell’s most important industrial sites in Nigeria, 
further light was shed on the company’s “new” way of dealing with communities: 
 
In the past we had a community development model that tended to separate project delivery 
[in Shell’s host communities] from community issues and dynamics.  Now the two concerns 
[projects and community issues] are properly waxed. We no longer just focus on project 
delivery; we also talk of community issues. We try to get the community involved, to build 
local participants so that they take care of the projects when we are gone.  This is the sort of 
discourse that now drives our involvement in community development.
4
 
 
As might be expected, the company has documented its own “case studies” – stories of local 
people made “successful”, and local projects adjudged “functional” and “sustainable”, 
through Shell’s  new“ sustainable community development” model (SPDC 2002:17, Shell 
2005:17). The challenge for scholars is to rely entirely on such “case studies” and self 
assessments, which typically form part of “sustainability” and “accountability” reports (see 
SPDC 2002:17), or complement them with critical beneficiary-focused studies of their own. In 
line with the latter option, a modest attempt is presented in the next section of this article.  
 
Especially concerning the adoption of a predominantly “philanthropic” CSR model, the point 
must be made that corporate-community involvement in the petroleum industry, as indeed 
any other industrial sector in Nigeria, is fundamentally guided by law (or, more appropriately, 
the lack of it).  As a key informant at Shell narrated to this author during an interview, CSR 
praxis in the oil industry is guided by the fact that: 
 
                                                 
4 Interview conducted by the author on May 16, 2003 at SPDC, Port Harcourt, Nigeria. 
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By law it’s not the duty of the oil companies to develop any community.  The law governing 
their operations did not mandate them to get into community development.  The companies 
pay tax, royalties, etc., and government should use this to develop the community.  At all 
levels we have a collapse of government.  Government is absent in these communities.  
Government gets its share [of petroleum revenues] and disappears.
5
              
 
The point was made earlier that Nigeria offers a particularly useful opportunity for doing 
corporate citizenship studies from the perspective of grassroots beneficiaries. This is 
important given what research has established about the character of industrial operations in 
Nigeria. For instance, UNEP (2003) paints a particularly worrying picture of the state of 
environmental sensitivity in Nigeria’s industrial landscape: 
 
Industrial pollution from over 5,000 industrial facilities and perhaps another 10,000 small-
scale industries, some operating illegally within residential premises, is a growing problem in 
Nigeria. In places like Kano, Kaduna, Port Harcourt, Warri and Lagos, colored, hot and heavy 
metal effluent, especially that from the textile, tannery, petrochemicals and paint industries, is 
discharged directly into open drainages and channels, constituting severe dangers to water 
users and downstream. Also disturbing is the practice where some industrial facilities bury 
their expired chemicals and hazardous wastes in their backyards, threatening the water 
quality of innocent neighbours who rely on their dug-out wells for drinking water (see also 
(Adediran et a, 2004). 
. 
 
Equally worrying is the fact that, historically, many business organizations perpetrating the 
reckless conduct described by the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) have 
showed little sensitivity towards communities directly affected by such recklessness (Akpan 
2006b). 
 
Of the industrial sectors that UNEP makes reference to, the upstream petroleum industry – 
the sector encompassing oil and gas exploration, oilfield development, production, and 
related activities – is understandably the most crucial for understanding the character of 
corporate citizenship in Nigeria. Firstly, petroleum is Nigeria’s most important economic 
commodity: it accounts for about 95 per cent of Nigeria’s export revenues and 80 per cent of 
federal budget funds.  Secondly, not unlike the Nigerian government, the oil producing 
communities have come to depend on petroleum (and in effect on the oil companies) for 
almost everything: social infrastructure, local socio-economic empowerment, reparation for 
some four decades of “lost” development, and for some socio-political leverage in Nigeria’s 
scheme of things (Akpan 2006a:233).  Thirdly, the companies have also come to define the 
future of their business in Nigeria – and in particular the Niger Delta – as dependent on their 
ability to stimulate local development in their host communities – besides the paying of taxes 
and royalties to the Nigerian government.  Shell, in particular, speaks of its “new” model of 
community development as having, among other objectives, that of helping the company to 
“secure license to operate… on a sustainable basis” (SPDC 2002:15). 
 
But probably more importantly, because oil operations impact the environment and local 
communities far more profoundly than many other industrial sectors, many oil companies 
seem to be finding it counterproductive to make light of corporate citizenship.  An illustration 
can be made with oil spills and gas flaring6 - two aspects of petroleum production that exert 
some of the worst impacts on the Niger Delta society and environment.   
 
When a panel of scientists from the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), World Conservation Union, 
and the National Conservation Foundation (Nigeria) declared recently in Abuja (the Nigerian 
capital city) that the Niger Delta has been impacted by as much as 1.5 million tons of oil 
since the 1950s (Vanguard 2006), they were drawing attention not simply to the pollution of 
                                                 
5 Interview conducted by the author with a key informant (a responsible officer) on May 16, 2003 at SPDC Port Harcourt, 
Nigeria.  For a detailed account of the legal/institutional framework for petroleum operations in Nigeria, see Akpan (2005). 
6 For a more comprehensive analysis of the social and environmental impacts of petroleum operations in Nigeria, see Akpan 
(2006b). 
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the physical environment, but to a local livelihood crisis affecting millions of local residents. 
Low pipeline integrity (arising from poor pipeline network maintenance), regulatory 
weaknesses, the natural moistness, salinity and corrosiveness of the Niger Delta 
environment, pipeline fires (much of it a result of community unrest), explosions, oil 
equipment malfunction, tanker leakages, and vandalism – these and more have been 
blamed for the frequency of oil spills in the Niger Delta.  While, globally, the worst spills are 
associated with crude oil transport – this often involving large quantities of oil per spill 
occurrence – oil spills in the Niger Delta is widely blamed on corporate recklessness and 
failings in the regulatory system (Akpan 2006b).   
 
On the occasions during the fieldwork when the author ferried into the creeks with young 
fishermen in Oloibiri and Iko as a way of understanding how they viewed their occupation, 
the men’s persistent complaint was that (subsistence) fishing, their main occupation, had 
“died” due to oil pollution. If the dark, stale, oily and stinky creeks – and the famished looks 
and dilapidated dwellings and fishing craft of the fishermen - could serve as physical 
evidence of this claim, then the author did witness the problem directly during his fieldwork.  
Ebubu, the third community, had, among other problems, a blemish that was more than three 
decades old: a soggy, barren and desolate expanse of land (measuring more than a dozen 
hectares) that once was a thriving communal farmland, but was destroyed in 1970 by a 
massive oil spill. The site had not been restored or cleaned as of 2003, when the author 
visited the community.   
 
Gas flaring, another of the Nigerian petroleum industry’s intractable problems, is evident in 
the orange-coloured night sky and in the atmospheric heat, sooty overhang, and the burning 
sensations local residents feel when inhaling air.  The proportions of total gas production and 
associated gas (that is the gas by-product of crude oil produced) are estimated to be about 
86 per cent and 95 per cent respectively (Oguejiofor 2004, HRW 1999).  This volume of gas 
is flared using what scientists have described as crude methods and “outdated flaring 
technology”, which is why the public health hazards are particularly severe (Sonibare and 
Akeredolu 2004, Oguejiofor 2004, Ishisone, 2004). 
 
Protests over these and other socio-environmental consequences of petroleum operations 
spotlight the region as a virtual war zone, with frequent banishment threats to the 
transnational oil companies, ambushing of oil infrastructure, and abductions – targeting 
mainly foreign oil workers (ThisDay 2006, The Guardian 2006).  The oil companies respond 
to these challenges in various ways.  The major transnationals typically now search for oil 
further and further away from the village communities and the continental shelf – and 
Nigeria’s deep offshore has become particularly busy in recent years as a result. Also, as the 
interview at Shell’s community affairs office (quoted earlier) shows, some operators seem to 
have brought on board a new CSR praxis, or at least are seeking a new balance between 
responsibility and rhetoric, as a way of “mak[ing] up for past mistakes” (Shell 2005:16) and 
negotiating their way back into communities that have become quite hostile. 
 
Taken together, the foregoing discussion underlines a need to constantly interrogate the 
corporate citizenship practices of business organisations – from the perspective of 
beneficiary communities, rather than merely from companies’ own appraisals of their goodwill 
towards communities and the environment. 
 
 
Corporate Citizenship: Privileging the Beneficiary Perspective 
 
During the fieldwork in the Niger Delta towns of Oloibiri, Ebubu and Iko, the author found that 
whereas oil companies speak glowingly about their social investments and other acts of 
kindness in their host communities, local people tended to see things differently.  For 
instance, while a company would readily hold up a community project it has “sponsored” as 
part of “sustainable” community development meant for the entire community (The Punch 
2005) – assuming the claim is not outright fictitious (Akpan 2006, Frynas 2000) - the project 
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might have been implemented in ways that sowed distrust and divisions in the community in 
question.  Interviews conducted with local leaders and ordinary residents in the three 
communities revealed that project delivery processes tended to follow what the respondents 
described as a “divide-and-rule” tactic. By “divide-and-rule”, the respondents meant that the 
companies preferred to operate through contractors and other local “intermediaries” “created” 
by them (to serve their interests), bypassing, and sometimes “manipulating”, the “legitimate” 
structures through which the communities were governed.  In so doing, they split 
communities into mutually antagonistic camps. The author learnt that such processes were a 
major factor in the intra- and inter-communal violence that erupted from time to time in the oil 
and gas producing communities.  The research implication here is that for every claim that a 
company’s “community development programmes is for all” (The Punch 2005), a researcher 
must try to uncover not necessarily whether a given community project has been completed, 
but more importantly who the real beneficiaries are, what community dynamics have been 
impacted in the delivery process, and to what consequences. 
 
There is also a CSR practice in the Nigerian petroleum industry that can be equated with 
Shober (2006:3) calls “identity rape”.  By this is meant the process whereby the socio-cultural 
and ecologic heritages of the oil and gas producing communities are trampled upon or 
rendered irrelevant to the companies or state agencies engaged in corporate citizenship 
activities. Village communities are reduced to functions, ecologic spaces are altered to 
economic spaces, indigenous, culturally significant trees and crops are downgraded to mere 
vegetation and given economistic price tags (Akpan 2005), people are grouped and re-
grouped to emphasise or de-emphasise their usefulness to transnational and local oil 
interests, and otherwise arcane petrolic idiosyncracies are forced upon the local socio-
linguistic landscape to produce a distancing discourse among ordinary people. For instance, 
the Niger Delta is conceptually mapped with such distancing terminologies as “oil well 
community”, pipeline community”, “landlord community”, settlers”, “key community”, and 
“non-key community”. Each term denotes the “function” of a community, its relative 
contribution to the oil economy, and, from a corporate citizenship point of view, the relative 
developmental benefit a community can consider itself legitimately entitled to. As one 
respondent narrated to this author during the fieldwork: 
 
They [the oil companies] fragment communities and devalue the contributions of communities 
so that they save money by spending less in the provision of amenities. It’s a strange kind of 
corporate responsibility (Akpan 2006a:236). 
 
To put the fieldwork findings into perspective, the author now makes a modest attempt to 
summarise some of the more common corporate citizenship pronouncements of the major oil 
and gas operators in Nigeria.  The pronouncements are then matched against the fieldwork 
data obtained in Oloibiri, Ebubu and Iko, and with relevant secondary data, with a view to 
highlighting how the theory and practice of corporate citizenship resonates at the grassroots.  
The result of this exercise is captured in Table 1.  It should probably be emphasized that the 
entries in Table 1 are not intended to belittle the role of business corporations in national 
development or their contributions to the socio-economic empowerment of people in their 
Niger Delta host communities.  What the Table seeks to do is to provide an empirical basis 
for interrogating specific developmental claims – claims which often form part of corporate 
sustainability and accountability reports. The aim is to encourage debates that would make 
corporate citizenship better respond to socio-economic, ecological and cultural challenges in 
the communities hosting major industrial operations.   
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Table 1: Corporate Citizenship Praxis: Views from Above and Below 
 
No. Corporate Pronouncements Resonance at the Grassroots 
1 “Our community development programme 
is for all” (The Punch 2005) 
A network of newly paved town streets and a 
community hall (projects sponsored by Shell) 
were an important evidence of this claim in 
Ebubu. However, the fieldwork in the three study 
communities revealed that in many other 
respects, programme delivery strategies often 
involved financial and other inducements and 
pacifications which bred distrust and conflict in the 
community (Akpan 2006a). 
The community project in question had not been 
completed. Local residents believed it had been 
abandoned. 
 
The project had become a subject of intense 
community squabbles.  
 
Claims of community gratitude were dismissed by 
community members as a corporate scam. 
 
2 Community ruler “salutes” a corporate 
benefactor (a development agency) for 
delivering developmental “goodies” to his 
community. The ruler “endorses” a 
community water scheme modeled on the 
front page of a full-colour newsletter 
published by the agency (NDDC News 
2003:1)  
A respondent’s comment:  
They [the development agency in 
question] trick an important person in 
the community [especially the local 
chief] into singing their praises so that 
they would have something [with which 
to] deceive the Presidency and cover up 
their non-performance.  With such 
words, Abuja will believe the job has 
been satisfactorily done.  What will ever 
bring NDDC back here to complete the 
projects?’
7
 
3 Full colour photographs – and positive 
grassroots “testimonials” of community 
projects in corporate social reports.  
While the only social amenities in rural 
communities such as Oloibiri, Ebubu and Iko often 
come from corporate social investments, 
companies sometimes pass off in their brochures 
uncompleted, abandoned, derelict or poorly 
completed projects, as well as project prototypes 
and photographs of projects located in foreign 
countries as those “completed” and in full use in 
the rural Niger Delta communities (Frynas 2000, 
Akpan 2006a; also see entry in 2 above). 
4 Oil companies blame community 
development failures in the Niger Delta on 
“inter-tribal violence”, and “corruption” in the 
oil region (Shell 2005:17) 
The fieldwork revealed that much of the “inter-
tribal violence” was a function of the “identity rape” 
and community fragmentation described earlier. 
 
                                                 
7 Interview conducted by the author in Oloibiri, Bayelsa State on March 20, 2003. 
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No. Corporate Pronouncements Resonance at the Grassroots 
CSR processes also bolstered a manipulative and 
rivalrous milieu whereby “local kings, ‘youth 
leaders’, local politicians, militant organization, 
influential local elite, urban-based cronies of oil 
company workers and individuals possibly serving 
as fronts for government functionaries” struggle to 
set themselves up as “local development 
intermediaries” (Akpan 2006a:237). 
 
  
The fieldwork also revealed what seemed like a 
“strategy by various organs in the development 
delivery process [including the oil companies] to 
do business with as little commitment to 
community development as possible (Akpan 
2006a).   
In the past the company had admitted to spending 
“more money on bribes and corruption than on 
community development projects” (quoted in 
Bustany and Wysham 2000).  Studies might be 
necessary to track the end-use of the 2004 spend.  
Another oil company similarly “wasted” about 
US$28 million community development budgets in 
[certain] parts of the [Niger] Delta between 1990 
and 1997 (Bustany and Wysham, 2000). 
 
5 Largest programmes of Shell’s $106 million 
social investment spend in 2004 were in 
Nigeria and the USA (Shell 2005:26)  
 
Also refer to entry in 4 above. 
During his fieldwork in 2003, the author found 
“little to suggest that ‘world class’ standards of 
community development had emerged or were 
taking root” in the three communities studied 
(Akpan 2006a:2006). 
 
6 To “make up for past mistakes”, Shell has 
turned to “world class standards of 
community development” since 1997. 
“Partly as a result of CSR interventions… each of 
the three communities presented the image of a 
house divided against itself” (Akpan 2006a:237)  
 
 
What probably does not come out clearly in Table 1 is that while ordinary people often speak 
of needs such as roads, town halls, water, electricity, reparation for environmental damage, 
compensation for vegetation destroyed in the industrial development, and economic 
empowerment of local citizens, they often also indicate that these projects, “compensations” 
and expectations could not come at all costs. The “benefits” could not be at the expense of 
deeply held community values. For instance, a young man suddenly made rich through 
winning an oil company contract to construct an overhead community water tank in his home 
town could not suddenly seek to become the indigenous ruler of the town unless he has the 
requisite, culturally defined qualifications to ascend to that office.  Benefactors could not also 
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be expected to interfere with, or otherwise influence, processes leading to the election of, 
say, a local King.   
 
For their part, the petroleum operators are driven principally by the need to ensure that they 
“secure… the license to operate… on a sustainable basis” (SPDC 2002:16). This sometimes 
means being seen to be doing something for a community. In order to deliver projects 
quickly, benefactors often avoid the time-consuming process of navigating complex 
community structures.  Rather they try to “grow their own timber” by “setting up” local 
representatives through whom to build “result-oriented” local partnerships with beneficiary 
communities. This is why the Niger Delta is characterized by intense jostling for relationships 
with oil companies, state agencies and political organs with important roles to play in the 
petroleum sector.  In such a milieu, it may not be out of place to say that interfering with the 
functioning of indigenous structures of community governance comes naturally!  Many local 
residents the author spoke with in Oloibiri, for instance, feared that the King was on the verge 
of being “dethroned” as a result of such dynamics.  Also in Oloibiri, where there was a 
breakdown of trust between a segment of the “youth” population and a segment of the 
“elders”, the author found that both sides attributed the tension to their differing perceptions 
of the rewards of community project delivery. 
 
Perhaps the most important point that can be made about corporate-community involvement 
in the three study communities is that as a social process, there is nothing linear about 
corporate citizenship.  Companies, state agencies, beneficiary communities – all enter the 
process with particular meanings, motivations and expectations, which often markedly differ. 
For a researcher, then, a beneficiary approach is a crucial opportunity for observing how the 
theory and practice of corporate citizenship play out.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While the period since the mid-1990s has witnessed an unprecedented wave of scholarly 
interest in the Nigerian petroleum industry, it is only in the last few years that “systematic” 
studies of petroleum-related community conflict and other sustainability dilemmas in the 
country’s oil region have begun to emerge (Obi 2005:1). The foregoing analysis has been an 
attempt to contribute to such “systematic” studies. In this case, the attempt has been to 
subject the conventional, corporatist and “practitioner-driven” discourse of corporate 
citizenship (Moon et al 2003:1) to a beneficiary-focused analysis. From ethnographic data 
obtained in three rural Niger Delta communities, the article has shown how the differing 
motivations and expectations of benefactors and beneficiaries of corporate-community 
involvement could sow distrust and conflict among different segments of the community.  
Indeed, if the narratives and experiences of ordinary people in the study communities could 
be generalized to the Niger Delta as whole, they could support the conclusion that corporate 
citizenship praxis has had important anti-developmental consequences in the oil region.   
 
While the discussion in the article need not be construed as an anti-theory of corporate 
citizenship, data from the study communities do provide some empirical basis for taking 
beneficiary narratives and experiences seriously, which could then mean doing corporate 
citizenship studies somewhat differently.   
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